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Kiriman 1
Anda menulispada 31 Januari 2010 jam 8:14
praxeology in human action..????explain for me..please
Kiriman 2
Kevin Currie-Knight menulispada 02 Februari 2010 jam 9:08
I am certainly no expert on Mises' and the Austrians' use of praxeology in economic theory. Nor am I sure whether I agree with it. But I can at least try to explain what it was getting at.
The pertinent paragraph in this article is:
"In summary, it's not so much that the method of the natural sciences doesn't work when it comes to human action, but rather that their use would overlook such an incredibly better set of tools that all of us possess. Nobody really knows why stones fall, and so the best we can do is invent physical "laws" that describe the empirical observations as closely as possible."
Mises applied praxeology to economics out of a conviction that economics was different in a key way from science: in order to make economic predictions, you had to understand not just HOW people act, but WHY people act. This 'why' questions means that economics can't be a science in the way positivists want it to be. While we can observe and falsify predictions, we must also be able to interpret human action and motivation and this simply cannot be done with the hypothetico-deductive model under which science generally proceeds.
To further the divide between science and economics, it is quite difficult if not impossible to do controlled experiments in economics. One must simply accept imperfect 'natural experiments' that cannot adjust for variables that need adjusting for (in order to make sure the result truly corroborates or falsifies a theory).
Thus, economics begins with speculation about how and why humans act and these speculations are praxeology.
Now, myself, I generally see praxeology as a way to interpret observations. In other words, it does little to observe humans without doing so under some theory of human intention. As vague as Mises' praxeology, it provides a theory of human motivation under which to generate economic predictions and interpret results of 'natural experiments' (like the housing boom and bust). If one does not have some theory or presuppositions about how and why humans act, then generating predictions becomes sheer guesswork and interpreting observations becomes difficult (because one cannot interpret those actions in intentional terms).
A big reason that I am trepidatious about praxeology in economics is that it makes easy the tendency to remove economics wholly from the realm of empiricality. I think it is true that economics can never be but a very imperfect science (as controlled experiments are very hard to do), but this does not mean that predictions based on praxeological principles cannot be corroborated or at least somewhat falsified by observable evidence.
Another reason I find praxeology hard to swallow in full is because, like Popper, I am generally wary of systems built on vague principles when those principles can be used to interpret so many - and sometimes wildly different - actions. Like Marx's dialectical materialism, there is a danger that praxeological principles can be used to interpret just about any observed situation as fitting with, rather than contradicting, the praxeological theory.
Again, I am not an expert in praxeology and have not studied Austrian economics nearly as much as some other folks. But those are my thoughts.
Kiriman 3
Anda menulispada 02 Februari 2010 jam 10:00
okay thanks Mr Kevin .,
That Praxeology is how and why humans act to get their purpose . and assume is rational ...
whether this is relevant if it is used for economic anthropology??
&
What literature I could learn, in addition to the work of Mises 'Human action'??
Kiriman 4
Kevin Currie-Knight menulispada 05 Februari 2010 jam 5:59
My view is that praxeology is somewhat relevant to any economic theory because all of them, at their core, must have a basic model of human motivation. Of course, the problem is that if it is seen as "a priori" than this somewhat immunizes it from being testable. And, as behavioral economics has largely found, human action is certainly not always (or even mostly?) rational.
I am not sure what literature exists about praxeology except for Mises's book. I know people say that Rothbard did a nice summary of praxeology, but I am not sure where: probably in "Logic of Liberty."
Kiriman 5
Kevin Currie-Knight menulispada 06 Februari 2010 jam 5:35
Adhy,
For more info on where else one can learn about praxeology, go to the Mises institute's thread "On Human Action" (should be a few below this discussion on the board). There was mention of a study guide that is available and a Rothbard book.
There is also this book. I just ran across it this morning.
http://mises.org/books/prax-and-understanding.pdf
Kiriman 6
Michael Kotlyarsky menulispada 10 Februari 2010 jam 20:41
Let me get it straight - you guys are guessing what praxeology might be based on reading nothing whatsoever about it? That's fun.
Praxeology is definitely not about *why* humans act. It does not have a concept of "rational". It is a science about logical implications of human actions, about means with relation to the ends. The ends, the motivations are given - they are outside the scope of praxeology. Others sciences deal with them - evolutionary psychology, neural science, behavioral genetics,
Praxeology is not built on vague principles. It's method is deductive logic - the least non-vague concept known to man, no speculation whatsoever. Praxeology is based on the single, most fundamental observation and single presumption.
The observation is that oneself acts - chooses. Everything else may be an illusion - sensual perceptions, memories, yet even in a sensory deprivation chamber a person can observe oneself choosing - if only the direction of one's thoughts. We can usually observe ourselves deliberately controlling our bodies. The presumption is that other people's minds work the same way.
Economics/Praxeology is not imperfect because it is not rooted in empiricism any more that mathematics is. Experiments are not "hard to do" - they are inapplicable in economics just as they are in mathematics.
It's a superstition to believe that scientific method is experimental. Scientific approach is to use methodology applicable to a given discipline - note the one popular due to success in some other sexy discipline.
The concepts that economics/praxeology/social sciences deal with are not observable through senses - there is no money, value, choice, cost, reward, punishment, government, virtue, novel, poem, etc. that one can objectively observe - all those are either concepts or relations that exist within human minds.
I would suggest Hayek's "Counter Revolution of Science" on the positivist fallacy and related matters - but it seems you are trying to acquire knowledge through other means than reading books. Is is clairvoyance? It doesn't seem to work, you should practice some more... :)
Kiriman 7
Ludwig von Mises Institute menulispada 10 Februari 2010 jam 23:40
'The concepts that economics/praxeology/social sciences deal with are not observable through senses - there is no money, value, choice, cost, reward, punishment, government, virtue, novel, poem, etc. that one can objectively observe - all those are either concepts or relations that exist within human minds.'
Sure they are. That is the point of thymology. Human understanding and experience which is a necessity in applying praxeological theory. Praxeology is the theory and thymology is the application of theory on reality. Roderick Long explains it best when he says ( paraphrasing ) praxeology can tell you all these conceptual laws about money but praxeology can't tell you what money is or where it is used in a given society. That is the basis of thymology which also can be speculative in nature. You can speculate on future human behavior using the thymological method/process. It doesn't make it objectively correct or apoditically certain though.
-Andrew Cain
Kiriman 8
Michael,
You do realize that Hayek believed that praxeology was insufficient to hang the whole of economics on, and very much disagreed with Mises on this point? (You are also aware that just about the entire economic universe, including those who share many of Mises's conclusions) disagree with Mises on that point?)
[In some sense, I would say that praxeology in economics is like dianetics in psychology: a system with a few diehard devotees that swear by its revolutionary nature but that's it.]
Kiriman 9
Kevin,
I believe you are disagreeing with me solely on the terminology - whether the term "economics" to be used as a subset of Praxeology or as a practical endeavor that involves the use of numerous disciplines, tacit knowledge, experience and rules of thumb.
I do not see a contradiction here - language associates numerous meanings to most words and we can use context or explicit specification in each particular discussion. I used the term "economics" is this thread in the same sense that Mises used the term "catallactics" - a subset of praxeology dealing with exchange.
In practice a person calling himself an economist could profitably use psychology, geography, history, physics, chemistry, climate science and many others - even math - to generate economic predictions.
That does not make praxeology any less sound, let alone "vague".
In my opinion, many people who disagree with Mises on some points often do not have a slightest idea what Mises actually says on that point. How many think that Praxeology is a kind of psychology?
Mises has never said or implied that praxeology was sufficient for analysis of reality - quite the opposite. He explained how, when all theoretical and natural knowledge has been applied to the analysis of a situation involving human action, there still remains ample scope for *understanding*.
Kiriman 10
"I believe you are disagreeing with me solely on the terminology - whether the term "economics" to be used as a subset of Praxeology or as a practical endeavor that involves the use of numerous disciplines, tacit knowledge, experience and rules of thumb."
My impression of Mises's praxeology, and I could well be wrong, is that Mises saw ecomics as a wholly inductive endeavor based on praxeological principles, and eschewing any attempts to make it into an empirical science, where conjectures could be corroborated or refuted by empirical means.
If this be the case, I take my stand with Hayek. Yes, economics deals at root with motivations, psychology, etc - which cannot be submitted to empirical testing - but this does not preclude submitting economic predictions to corroboration or falsification (especially the latter). I am also iffy that IF my above depiction is accurate, economics essentially becomes a field that ields unfalsifiable predictions.
"In practice a person calling himself an economist could profitably use psychology, geography, history, physics, chemistry, climate science and many others - even math - to generate economic predictions.
That does not make praxeology any less sound, let alone "vague"."
It does if, in a Popperian sense, one can explain potentially falsifying observations away using non-empirical things like appeals to unconscious motives, etc. (This ability to appeal to unconscious motives was what made Freudian psychology so able to take falsifying instances and interpret them as verifying instances.)
"Mises has never said or implied that praxeology was sufficient for analysis of reality - quite the opposite. He explained how, when all theoretical and natural knowledge has been applied to the analysis of a situation involving human action, there still remains ample scope for *understanding*."
You likely know more on praxeology than I do, but I thought Mises wrote an entire book that's conclusion hinted that this "ample scope" for "understanding" rendered economics to be a non-empirical science. (That is where Hayek agreed in part - about the necessity of extra-empirical interpretation) and dissented in part - that this means economic predictions cannot be tested, in part, by empirical means.
Kiriman 11
- "My impression of Mises's praxeology, and I could well be wrong, is that Mises saw ecomics as a wholly inductive endeavor based on praxeological principles, and eschewing any attempts to make it into an empirical science, where conjectures could be corroborated or refuted by empirical means."
You are mistaken. He saw **development** of economic theory as a wholly DEductive (not inductive) endeavor.
That is distinct from applying economic theory to expain or predict empirical reality - which may also be called "economics".
- "It does if, in a Popperian sense, one can explain potentially falsifying observations away using non-empirical things like appeals to unconscious motives, etc."
People have free will. One does not have to appeal to anything to explain choices that people can make - at least not in Praxeological context. There are no observations of human behavior that can falsify praxeological theorems - if you think so, you may not have the correct idea what kind of statements praxeology makes. The issues are orthogonal. A human being can act on each of infinity of choices in a given situation and that is the premise of Praxeology, not a confounding factor. It's the logical implications of human action it deals with - not motives.
- "You likely know more on praxeology than I do, but I thought Mises wrote an entire book that's conclusion hinted that this "ample scope" for "understanding" rendered economics to be a non-empirical science. (That is where Hayek agreed in part - about the necessity of extra-empirical interpretation) and dissented in part - that this means economic predictions cannot be tested, in part, by empirical means."
There are two distinct non-empirical categories. Deductive logic is one thing, and "understanding" is quite another. The former is explicit and formal, the latter is tacit.
We can talk about the law of supply and demand ot diminishing returns - and we can talk about pride and jealousy. Both make sense to us without resorting to any empirical methods.
